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JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
I. Background 
The United States appeals orders of the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
sentencing Appellee James Hall to fifteen months‟ 
imprisonment and Appellee Paul Negroni to five years‟ 
probation, including nine months‟ in-home detention.  
Because the District Court committed procedural error in 
reaching both of those sentences, we will vacate the orders 
and remand for resentencing. 
 
A. Factual History 
 
These consolidated cases spring from a massive fraud 
scheme organized and conducted by a man named Kevin 
Waltzer.  Between the years 2000 and 2008, Waltzer 
fraudulently obtained more than $40 million in payments 
from settlement funds in three class action lawsuits: In re 
Nasdaq Market-Makers Antitrust Litigation, No. Civ. 94-
3996(RWS) (S.D.N.Y.) (the “Nasdaq Class Action”), In re 
Cendant Corporation Litigation, No. Civ. 98-1664(WHW) 
(D.N.J.) (the “Cendant Class Action”), and In re 
BankAmerica Corporation Securities Litigation, No. MDL 
1264 (E.D. Mo.) (the “BankAmerica Class Action”).  His 
scheme involved the submission of false claims in which he, 
or individuals enlisted by him, asserted ownership or the 
trading of certain relevant securities during the relevant class 
periods when, in fact, the claimants did not own or trade the 
securities and, thus, were not entitled to recovery.   
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Waltzer and his cohorts took elaborate steps to 
perpetrate the scheme, including the creation of fake 
corporations, the establishment of virtual offices for those 
corporations, and the creation of fake financial documents 
that indicated ownership and trades.  In addition, one of the 
schemers, Christian J. Penta (“Penta”), was employed by 
Heffler, Raditich, & Saitta (“Heffler”), the accounting firm 
responsible for distributing settlement funds, and took steps to 
ensure that claims were approved without anyone at Heffler 
becoming aware of the fraud.  In 2007, the scheme was 
uncovered by the IRS, and, in cooperation with the IRS 
investigation, Waltzer began to provide information regarding 
the other individuals involved, including Hall and Negroni.   
 
 1. Hall’s Role in the Scheme 
 
Hall‟s role dated to 2002, when, as he later admitted, 
he submitted a fraudulent claim in the Nasdaq Class Action.  
In that claim, he falsely stated that he had traded more than 19 
million shares of Nasdaq listed securities.  As recompense, 
Hall received $507,910.99, of which he wired $200,000 to 
Waltzer and $100,000 to Penta as their shares of the theft. 
 
The government alleged that Hall also participated in 
making other fraudulent claims, and the initial Presentence 
Investigation Report in his case (the “PSR”) contained an 
outline of his involvement in those claims.  More particularly, 
based on information obtained from Waltzer, Paragraph 45 of 
the PSR stated that Hall had assisted Waltzer by 
impersonating representatives of fake companies that were 
used for submitting claims.  For instance, after a 
$2,144,778.85 check issued for a claim filed in the Cendant 
Class Action on behalf of a fake company called Far East 
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Trading, LLC (“Far East”), Hall posed as a fictional partner 
in Far East, contacted the bank in which the funds were 
deposited, and authorized Waltzer to receive the proceeds of 
the check on behalf of Far East.  As described later in greater 
detail, the District Court struck Paragraph 45 from the PSR 
before sentencing Hall. 
 
2. Negroni’s Role in the Scheme 
 
From his youth, Negroni had known and associated 
with Waltzer, and, like Hall, Negroni submitted a false claim 
in the Nasdaq Class Action in 2002, stating that he had traded 
millions of shares of Nasdaq listed securities during the class 
period.  He received $449,009.23 as payment for that claim.  
Negroni also assisted Waltzer in creating a fake corporation 
called the Denver Corporation (“Denver”), for which Waltzer 
submitted a fraudulent claim in the BankAmerica Class 
Action.  Denver received a check for $228,795.82 as payment 
for that claim, which Negroni deposited into an account he 
had created for Denver.  On September 23, 2004, Negroni 
wired $190,000 of the proceeds from that check to Waltzer‟s 
bank account.    
 
B. Procedural History 
 
On June 30, 2009, Negroni pled guilty to mail fraud, 
wire fraud, and money laundering
1
 and, on July 1, 2009, Hall  
                                              
1
 Specifically, Negroni‟s plea agreement states that he 
“agreed to plead guilty to the following charges in the 
superseding indictment: two counts of mail fraud, in violation 
of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1346, and 1349 (Counts 2 and 3), three 
counts of wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343, 1346, 
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pled guilty to mail fraud, wire fraud, and tax evasion.
2
   
Sentencing hearings for both defendants were held on 
November 23, 2009. 
 
1. Hall’s Sentencing Hearing 
 
At sentencing, the government argued for an offense 
level for Hall of 29, which included a six-level enhancement 
under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines (“USSG” or the 
“Guidelines”) § 2B1.1(b)(2)(C) based on the government‟s 
assertion that Hall‟s offense involved more than 250 victims.  
Although Hall had pled only to participation in the Nasdaq 
Class Action, which was not shown to involve more than 250 
victims, the government argued and presented evidence that 
Hall facilitated false claims submitted in the Cendant and 
BankAmerica Class Actions, which did involve such large 
numbers of victims. 
 
To support its argument, the government presented 
testimony from IRS Agent Thomas Kauffman (“Kauffman”), 
                                                                                                     
and 1349 (Counts 7, 10, and 12), two counts of money 
laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1957 (Counts 13 and 
14), and aiding and abetting, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2.”  
(App. at 71.) 
2
 Hall‟s plea agreement states that he agreed to plead 
guilty to “one count of mail fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 1341, 1346, and 1349 (Count 1), two counts of wire fraud, 
in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343, 1346, and 1349 (Counts 7 
and 15), one count of tax evasion, in violation of 26 U.S.C. 
§ 201 (Count 17), and aiding and abetting, in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 2.”  (App. at 90.) 
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who recounted Waltzer‟s description of the fraudulent Far 
East claim (which was submitted in the Cendant Class 
Action), including Hall‟s assistance in getting the money for 
that claim released to Waltzer.  Kauffman also testified 
regarding an e-mail purportedly sent from Waltzer to Hall 
that included the script Hall was to follow when posing as the 
Far East partner (the “script e-mail”).  He further testified 
that, according to Waltzer, Hall had adopted other aliases and 
made calls to assist Waltzer in other fraudulent claims in both 
the Cendant and BankAmerica Class Actions.  Waltzer‟s 
account was corroborated by evidence that he had sent 
$100,000 to Hall immediately after the Far East check cleared 
and that, between April 2, 2003 and August 11, 2004, Waltzer 
wired Hall numerous payments totaling nearly $600,000 
(including the $100,000 after the Far East check cleared).  
Thus Hall‟s profit from the scheme was alleged to be in 
excess of $800,000: the more than $200,000 retained from the 
settlement check he received pursuant to his admitted 
participation in the false Nasdaq claim, plus several wire 
transfers from Waltzer amounting to some $600,000.  The 
additional $600,000 is not explained by anything to which 
Hall has confessed, but Waltzer told Kauffman it was the total 
of payments he made to Hall for facilitating false claims in 
the Cendant and BankAmerica Class Actions.
3
  
                                              
3
 The parties have shown some confusion about the 
exact amount and source of Hall‟s fraud proceeds.  In 
response to a post-argument letter from Hall‟s counsel (in 
which she clarified her position that while there was evidence 
that Hall had received $800,000 in fraud proceeds, it was not 
uncontroverted that those proceeds were for participation in 
the fraudulent scheme), the government‟s attorney submitted 
a letter stating that Hall‟s counsel now recognized Hall had 
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On cross examination, Kauffman acknowledged 
irregularities regarding the script e-mail, including that it 
appeared not to have been forensically downloaded from 
Waltzer‟s computer as other documents had been, that the 
body of the e-mail did not appear lined up with the header 
and “look[ed] like it was printed cock-eyed,” (App. at 710) 
and that the phone number for the e-mail recipient was a New 
York number, which Hall, who lived in Baltimore, was not 
known to have.  Kauffman also testified that, despite 
subpoenaing Hall‟s phone records, the investigators did not 
find any record of the phone calls Waltzer testified Hall had 
made.   
 
                                                                                                     
received “proceeds totaling $300,000 (above the $500,000 
which Hall received directly from his claim in the NASDAQ 
litigation).”  That response is confusing and does not 
accurately reflect the record.  According to an exhibit 
prepared by Kauffman, which accompanied his testimony, 
Hall received a gross total of $1,100,110.99 in fraud 
proceeds: $507,910.99 from the Nasdaq claim and $592,200 
in wired payments from Waltzer.  From the Nasdaq claim 
proceeds, Hall wired $300,000 to Waltzer and Penta.  Thus, 
according to Kauffman‟s exhibit, Hall‟s net proceeds were 
$800,110.99: $207,910.99 from the Nasdaq claim and 
$592,200 in wired payments from Waltzer.  
Whether Hall received an additional $300,000 or 
$600,000 from Waltzer makes little difference, however, as 
either way Hall received hundreds of thousands of dollars not 
explained by his submission of the single claim in the Nasdaq 
Class Action. 
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Following Kauffman‟s testimony, the defense asked 
the Court to strike Paragraph 45, which outlined Hall‟s 
alleged calls on behalf of Far East, as described by Kauffman.  
The defense argued that “45 relies upon the documents for 
which there is absolutely no independent corroboration.  It 
came from Waltzer, made by Waltzer, interpreted by 
Waltzer.”  (App. at 734.)  The District Court responded that it 
was “not willing to accept carte blanche what Waltzer told 
anybody” but questioned whether there was “reason to say 
that [Waltzer was lying] in this context of his testimony” 
other than “the mere existence of his cooperation status.”  
(App. at 737-38.)  The Court did not immediately rule on the 
defense motion to strike but instead turned to a discussion of 
other portions of the PSR. At the completion of that 
discussion, the Court, without explanation, stated that it was 
“going to strike [P]aragraph 45.”  (App. at 739.)   
 
As a result of Paragraph 45‟s removal from the PSR 
and hence from consideration, the government conceded that 
the six-level enhancement for 250 or more victims was not 
appropriate, and the District Court eliminated the 
enhancement.  That resulted in Hall‟s calculated offense level 
being 23, and, since his criminal history category was I, the 
consequent Guidelines range called for 46 to 57 months‟ 
imprisonment.  The government requested a sentence “in the 
higher end of the guideline range,” giving its reasons as 
follows: 
 
The government sees the defendant as more 
culpable than the remaining defendants.  His 
involvement with Mr. Waltzer was far more 
extensive.  I know your honor struck that 
paragraph from the presentence report but you 
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heard the testimony of Agent Kauffman, you 
saw the records and the financial records that 
showed that this defendant received over 
$800,000 from Mr. Waltzer for his participation 
in this scheme. 
 
(App. at 749.) 
 
Despite the government‟s request for a sentence at the 
high end of the Guidelines range, the Court varied downward 
and sentenced Hall to 15 months‟ imprisonment, as well as 
restitution in the amount of $572,279.99.  The government 
then objected to the sentence as unreasonable.
4
   
                                              
4
 On appeal, the government‟s sole basis for contesting 
Hall‟s sentence is the argument that the District Court erred 
procedurally in striking Paragraph 45 and, thus, eliminating 
the six-level enhancement.  Because the government 
challenges neither the procedural adequacy of any other part 
of the Court‟s decision (including the downward variance 
from the calculated Guidelines range) nor the substantive 
reasonableness of the sentence, we do not discuss the Court‟s 
explanation for those decisions.   
We must correct, however, the government‟s 
erroneous assertion that, despite its not having addressed the 
substantive reasonableness of Hall‟s sentence, it has not 
waived that issue and may raise it in a future appeal.  The 
government suggests that our decision in United States v. 
Merced, 603 F.3d 203 (3d Cir. 2010), instructs that the 
procedural and substantive reasonableness of a sentence can 
and should be raised in separate appeals.  Merced gives no 
such instruction but simply explains that “[i]f the district 
court commits procedural error, our preferred course is to 
11 
 
2. Negroni’s Sentencing Hearing 
 
For Negroni, the District Court calculated a criminal 
history category of I and an offense level of 27, which 
included the six-level enhancement for 250 or more victims, 
based on Negroni‟s involvement in the Denver claim for the 
BankAmerica Class Action.  Those calculations resulted in a 
Guidelines range of 70 to 87 months‟ imprisonment.  Negroni 
argued for a downward variance, saying both that he had 
diminished capacity and that, due to a lack of guidance in his 
youth, he had developed an unhealthy reliance on Waltzer.  
To support those claims, Negroni submitted numerous letters 
                                                                                                     
remand the case for re-sentencing, without going any 
further.”  Id. at 214.  Thus, if we find that a sentence is the 
product of procedural error, we may decline to consider any 
arguments contesting the substantive reasonableness of that 
sentence until after a district court has corrected the 
procedural problems.  The fact that our decision regarding 
procedural error may sometimes obviate the need for us to 
address substantive reasonableness does not, by any stretch, 
excuse an appellant from raising substantive reasonableness 
in the initial appeal.  Having failed to do so here, the 
government has waived any challenge to the substantive 
reasonableness of the sentence now under review. 
We do not mean to say, though, that if, on remand, the 
District Court were to impose a new sentence, the 
government would not be able to challenge the substantive 
reasonableness of that sentence.  The government would 
never have had the opportunity to appeal that sentence and, 
therefore, could not have waived any challenge as to either its 
procedural or substantive reasonableness.  
12 
 
from family and friends and reports from Dr. Thomas 
Kucharski, a psychologist who evaluated Negroni, and Lara 
Fastman, a therapist who had treated him.   
 
In letters to the Court, Negroni‟s brother and wife each 
described the abuse suffered by Negroni as a child and the 
lack of male supervision that led Negroni to bond with 
Waltzer and to look up to him as a father figure.  Upon 
reviewing those letters and evaluating Negroni, Dr. Kucharski 
reported that “as a result of substantial abuse and neglect 
[Negroni] suffers from and has suffered from since childhood 
serious psychological deficits and liabilities,” which caused 
Negroni to “form an intense dependent attachment to Mr. 
Waltzer.”  (App. at 289.)  That attachment resulted in a 
“naïve trust in Mr. Waltzer, a strong need to please, low self 
esteem and a denigrating self appraisal,” which “strongly 
influenced Mr. Negroni‟s involvement with Mr. Waltzer in 
the instant offense.”  (Id.)  Fastman‟s report made similar 
findings, diagnosing Negroni as having  “Dependent 
Personality Disorder,” which resulted in an “unhealthy 
attachment to [Waltzer],” which “prevented him from 
realizing [Waltzer‟s] lies and deceits” and “from questioning 
[Waltzer‟s] business plans.”  (App. at 286-87.)  She 
concluded that Negroni‟s “fear of being alone and without 
[Waltzer] led him to agree with things he felt wrong rather 
than risk losing the relationship.”  (App. at 287.)  Negroni 
also submitted his own letter to the Court in which, despite 
his experts‟ assertions about Waltzer‟s unusual influence in 
his life, he purported to take “full responsibility for [his] 
actions,” stating that he, not Waltzer, was “responsible for 
this mistake.”  (App. at 285.) 
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After hearing the evidence and arguments, the Court 
considered the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and, 
while imposing sentence, said the following: 
 
I consider … the nature and circumstances of 
the offense.  And in this particular case we have 
a massive criminal fraud scheme that resulted in 
a loss of over $40 million that was orchestrated 
by Kevin Waltzer. 
 
Mr. Negroni‟s role, albeit not minor, was 
limited to only a portion of the scheme and loss.  
He was involved in not only the fraud itself but 
also in money laundering.  He was lured into 
this scam by his long-time friend, Waltzer, 
whom he knew from childhood and trusted as a 
brother.  There was also two separate claims in 
this particular case, Mr. Negroni‟s alone and 
then the Denver Corporation later.  He received 
money from both. 
 
I look at the history and characteristics of the 
defendant.  And what I see is a 42-year old man 
who is married and the father of twins.  That he 
is actively and intimately involved in the 
nurturing of his children. 
 
He had a disruptive and unstable childhood 
punctuated by violence.  He has a dependent 
personality disorder, which makes him a 
follower rather than a leader.  He is a college 
graduate who has no prior contact with the 
criminal justice system.  He is physically well.  
14 
 
He has depression, anxiety, which is really a 
result of his predicament caused by his 
involvement here.  He certainly does not have a 
substantially reduced mental capacity as a result 
of his psychological disorder; nevertheless, it is 
there.  He has been involved in various 
businesses and jobs over the years, with no real 
substantial income reported.  He seems to be a 
dreamer, a fantasizer of what he can be when he 
grows up.  He has worked as a stock trader on 
Wall Street businesses.  Until I heard him today 
I was not so sure that he had accepted his 
responsibility.  But I‟m convinced that he has 
and is truly remorseful not only because he has 
gotten himself in this jam, because he 
recognizes that it was wrong. 
 
I consider the need to impose a sentence that 
reflects the seriousness of the offenses as I have 
described it.  To afford deterrence, promote 
respect for the law, and to protect the public 
from the defendant‟s further crimes. 
 
Mr. Negroni will never have any further contact 
with the criminal justice system.  The damage 
to his reputation and what he has to do now to 
explain to his children what he has done, and 
what it means to his reputation are substantial in 
this case. 
 
I consider the need to provide him with needed 
educational, vocational training and correctional 
treatment in the most effective manner, the kind 
15 
 
of sentences that are recommended, the 
sentencing ranges recommended, the pertinent 
policy statements issued by the sentencing 
commission, the need to avoid unwarranted 
sentence disparities among defendants with 
similar records who have been found guilty of 
similar conduct and the need to provide the 
victims with restitution. 
 
Therefore the Defendant shall make restitution 
in the amount of $677,805.05, less credit for 
those amounts that he has deposited …  
 
The defendant is sentenced to a period of 
probation of five years with the first nine 
months to be served in home detention under 
electronic monitoring. 
 
(App. at 642-45.) 
 
Upon announcement of the sentence, the government 
objected to the variance “from the Guidelines range of 70 
months to home confinement” as unreasonable.  (App. at 
645.)  In response, the Court stated “I thought you told me it 
would be somewhere under Mr. Hall,” to which the 
government attorney replied, “I said that he was less culpable 
than Mr. Hall … but I also objected to Mr. Hall‟s sentence as 
unreasonable.”  (Id.) 
 
The government has timely appealed the sentences of 
both Hall and Negroni.   
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II. Discussion
5
 
 
A. The Roles of District and Appellate Courts in  
 Sentencing 
 
In sentencing a defendant, district courts follow a well-
established three step process:  First, the court calculates the 
applicable Guidelines range.  United States v. Tomko, 562 
F.3d 558, 567 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc).  Second, it considers 
any motions for departure and, if granted, states how the 
departure affects the Guidelines calculation.  Id.  Third, it 
considers the § 3553(a) factors
6
 and determines the 
                                              
5
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 
U.S.C. § 3231.  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3742(b) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
6
 Section 3553(a) lists the following factors for a court 
to consider: 
 
(1)  the nature and circumstances of the 
offense and the history and characteristics 
of the defendant;  
(2)  the need for the sentence imposed (A) to 
reflect the seriousness of the offense, to 
promote respect for the law, and to provide 
just punishment for the offense; (B) to 
afford adequate deterrence to criminal 
conduct; (C) to protect the public from 
further crimes of the defendant; and (D) to 
provide the defendant with needed 
educational or vocational training, medical 
care, or other correctional treatment in the 
most effective manner;  
17 
 
appropriate sentence, which may vary upward or downward 
from the range suggested by the Guidelines.
7
  Id. 
 
Our review of a criminal sentence “proceeds in two 
stages.”  Id.  We first review for procedural error, “such as 
failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines 
range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to 
consider the § 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on 
clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the 
chosen sentence – including an explanation for any deviation 
                                                                                                     
(3)  the kinds of sentences available;  
(4)  the kinds of sentence and the sentencing 
range established for … the applicable 
category of offense committed by the 
applicable category of defendant as set 
forth in the guidelines … ;  
(5)  any pertinent policy statement  … issued 
by the Sentencing Commission … ; 
(6)  the need to avoid unwarranted sentence 
disparities among defendants with similar 
records who have been found guilty of 
similar conduct; and  
(7)  the need to provide restitution to any 
 victims of the offense.  
 
7
 As a matter of terminology, a “departure” refers to a 
deviation from the step-one Guidelines calculations based on 
provisions within the Guidelines themselves and results in a 
change to the recommended Guidelines range.  A “variance,” 
by contrast, refers to a deviation from the recommended 
Guidelines range based on the statutory factors outlined in 
§ 3553(a).  Tomko, 562 F.3d at 562 n.3. 
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from the Guidelines range.”  Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 
38, 51 (2007).  If we find procedural error “our preferred 
course is to remand the case for re-sentencing, without going 
any further.”  United States v. Merced, 603 F.3d 203, 214 (3d 
Cir. 2010).  In the absence of procedural error, we review for 
substantive reasonableness, and “we will affirm [the 
sentence] unless no reasonable sentencing court would have 
imposed the same sentence on that particular defendant for 
the reasons the district court provided.”  Tomko, 562 F.3d at 
567.  At both the procedural and substantive stages, we 
review for abuse of discretion.  United States v. Wise, 515 
F.3d 207, 217-18 (3d Cir. 2008). 
 
B. Hall’s Sentence 
 
On appeal, the government argues that the District 
Court committed procedural error in striking Paragraph 45 
and, consequently, in failing to include the six-level 
enhancement.  According to the government, the evidence of 
Hall‟s involvement in other frauds was so overwhelming that 
the Court abused its discretion by rejecting it, and the Court 
further erred by offering no explanation for its decision to 
strike Paragraph 45.  Hall responds that the proof of his 
participation in other frauds was not overwhelming because 
evidence presented to the District Court challenged Waltzer‟s 
credibility.  Moreover, Hall contends, as to the striking of 
Paragraph 45, the District Court adequately explained its 
decision by making it clear throughout the proceedings that it 
doubted Waltzer‟s story.  Despite the vigor invested in the 
parties‟ competing arguments on this point, we need not 
decide whether the rejection of Paragraph 45 necessarily 
amounts to an abuse of discretion.  It is sufficient to observe 
that, given the evidence supporting that portion of the PSR, 
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the District Court failed to give an adequate explanation for 
the rejection. 
 
Waltzer told Kauffman that Hall participated in 
fraudulent claims in the Cendant and BankAmerica Class 
Actions by calling banks and other companies while falsely 
posing as an authorized agent of claimants in those Actions, 
as, for example, with respect to the Far East fraud.  (See supra 
Part I(A)(1).)  Waltzer‟s story in that regard was corroborated 
by the introduction of documentary evidence, including the 
script e-mail, and by evidence that Waltzer wired Hall 
$100,000 immediately after the Far East fraud and wired him 
hundreds of thousands of dollars in additional payments 
during 2003 and 2004.  As the government rightly notes, the 
timing of the $100,000 payment strongly corroborates 
Waltzer‟s assertion that Hall was involved in the Far East 
fraud.  Likewise, the fact that Waltzer‟s total payments to 
Hall were nearly three times greater than the $200,000 that 
Hall received in connection with the Nasdaq Class Action 
corroborates Waltzer‟s description of Hall‟s involvement as 
going beyond the filing of that single Nasdaq claim.  Thus, 
we agree with the government that there is persuasive 
evidence to support the facts set forth in Paragraph 45. 
 
 Nonetheless, we recognize, as Hall argues, that the 
District Court was presented with evidence challenging 
Waltzer‟s account – particularly, Kauffman‟s admission that 
Hall‟s phone records do not show any of the calls Waltzer 
claims were made and Kauffman‟s acknowledgement of 
irregularities in the script e-mail.  Furthermore, while Hall 
was paid some $600,000 more than his take on the fraudulent 
Nasdaq claim that underpins his guilty plea, that fact does not 
necessarily prove (as the District Court notes) that Hall‟s 
20 
 
additional participation was in frauds pertaining to the 
BankAmerica or Cendant Class Actions, which are the only 
bases for saying there were 250 or more victims of Hall‟s 
fraudulent activities.  Thus, although the financial evidence 
testified to by Kauffman corroborates some of Waltzer‟s 
account of Hall‟s participation in all three Class Actions, it is 
possible, given the evidence arrayed on both sides, that the 
District Court nonetheless found that account to be incredible.  
Certainly, the Court had indicated that it was “not willing to 
accept carte blanche what Waltzer told anybody.”  (App. at 
737.)  At the same time, however, the Court expressed 
skepticism that there was any “reason to say that [Waltzer 
was lying] in this context of his testimony.”  (Id.)  Thus, it is 
not clear from the record whether the Court found Waltzer‟s 
account to be incredible or otherwise why, ultimately, the 
Court struck Paragraph 45.  We are left wondering.   
 
Because “there is no way to review [the District 
Court‟s] exercise of discretion” when it did “not articulate the 
reasons underlying its decision,” Merced, 603 F.3d at 216 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted), we will 
vacate Hall‟s sentence and remand for resentencing, trusting 
that the District Court will provide an explanation sufficient 
to allow for appellate review.
8
 
                                              
8
 In arguing that the District Court erred when it struck 
Paragraph 45, the government also challenged what it 
describes as the District Court‟s refusal to consider transcripts 
of various phone calls that the government claims would 
prove Hall‟s participation in the other frauds.  Hall counters 
that the District Court did not refuse to consider the 
transcripts but, instead, simply set them aside for later 
consideration and that the government failed to bring them up 
21 
 
 
C. Negroni’s Sentence 
 
The government argues that Negroni‟s sentence was 
unreasonable because “the district court did not give 
meaningful consideration to the factors that called for a 
significant prison sentence.”9  (Gov. Br. at 47.)  Negroni 
                                                                                                     
again when the District Court gave it the opportunity.  Given 
our decision to remand for resentencing, we need not decide 
whether the District Court refused to consider the transcripts 
or whether such refusal would be an abuse of discretion.  On 
remand, the government is free to ask that the transcripts and 
any other evidence brought to the District Court‟s attention at 
sentencing be explicitly considered. 
9
 Negroni argues that the government cannot challenge 
the procedural reasonableness of his sentence because, in its 
Statement of Issues on Appeal, the government asserted only 
that it was contesting the substantive reasonableness of 
Negroni‟s sentence and, therefore, has waived any challenge 
to the procedural reasonableness.  In the Statement of Issues 
and throughout its brief, the government does, indeed, 
describe its argument as challenging the substantive 
reasonableness of Negroni‟s sentence rather than the 
procedural reasonableness of the sentence.  Nonetheless, 
despite that description, many of the arguments it presents fall 
squarely within the definition of procedural error articulated 
by the Supreme Court in Gall.  As Negroni points out, for 
instance, Gall lists “failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors” 
as procedural error, 552 U.S. at 51, and the government 
claims that the District Court “failed to give meaningful 
consideration to the factors that called for a significant prison 
sentence,” (Gov. Br. at 47).  Thus, despite the label applied 
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responds that, although the Court did not explicitly rely on all 
the § 3553(a) factors, it “weighed the totality of the 
factors … giving them meaningful consideration,” and “had 
no duty to „discuss and make findings as to each of 
the … factors [because] the record makes clear [it] took the 
factors into account in sentencing.‟”10  (Negroni Br. at 54 
(quoting Tomko, 562 F.3d at 568).)   
                                                                                                     
by the government, its arguments include a challenge to the 
procedural reasonableness of Negroni‟s sentence. 
Nevertheless, while we agree with Negroni that the 
government‟s arguments address primarily procedural errors, 
we do not agree that the government has somehow waived 
any argument with respect to procedural error simply because 
the Statement of Issues labels the challenge as substantive 
rather than procedural.  Negroni has identified no case in 
which an issue has been found waived where it was argued in 
the briefs but mislabeled in the Statement of Issues.  
Furthermore, while the Statement of Issues may have used the 
word “substantive” rather than “procedural,” it still notified 
the Court and the parties that the issue on appeal is the 
reasonableness of Negroni‟s sentence, and the brief sets forth 
at length the precise bases for that challenge.  Negroni cannot, 
therefore, claim to have been left in the dark as to the nature 
of the government‟s challenge, and, in fact, Negroni has not 
claimed to have suffered any prejudice as a result of the 
government‟s mislabeling.  Thus, we reject Negroni‟s 
assertion that the government has waived any challenge to the 
procedural adequacy of his sentence. 
10
 Negroni addressed the Court‟s consideration of the § 
3553(a) factors in his discussion of the substantive 
reasonableness of his sentence because, as discussed supra 
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Again, our review is frustrated because, while the 
District Court individually identified each § 3553(a) factor, it 
did not discuss some of them and, as to those it did discuss, it 
did not explain how they justified the frankly dramatic 
downward variance it gave.  The insufficiency of the 
explanation prevents us from judging whether the Court 
“gave meaningful consideration” to the relevant factors and is 
itself procedural error.  In addition, to the extent the District 
Court‟s lenient sentence of  Negroni was influenced by the 
government‟s assertion that Hall was more culpable than 
Negroni, that too is procedural error.  We discuss each of 
those problems in turn. 
 
1. The District Court’s Consideration of the 
§ 3553(a) Factors and the Explanation 
for Its Sentence 
  
 “Appellate review, limited though it is by the abuse-
of-discretion standard, … requires district courts to plainly 
state the reasoning behind each sentence.  Moreover, in 
deciding on appeal whether the reasons provided by a district 
court are adequate, the degree that a sentence varies from the 
                                                                                                     
note 9, the government describes its arguments as addressing 
substantive reasonableness only.  As already discussed, 
however, the sufficiency of a court‟s consideration of the § 
3553(a) factors is a question of procedural reasonableness, 
not substantive, and we therefore consider it in that light.  
Other than arguing that the government has waived any 
argument regarding procedural reasonableness, Negroni does 
not offer any argument explicitly directed to the procedural 
reasonableness of his sentence. 
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recommendation given in the Guidelines matters.”  United 
States v. Levinson, 543 F.3d 190, 197 (3d Cir. 2008).  Thus, 
while we eschew any strict proportionality test requiring that 
unusual variations  from the Guidelines be based on equally 
unusual circumstances, we do require that a substantial 
variation be accompanied by a more complete explanation 
than would be required for a sentence within or only modestly 
outside the Guidelines range.  Id. 
 
Here, the Guidelines called for a range of 70 to 87 
months‟ imprisonment and the District Court imposed a 
sentence of 60 months‟ probation, with 9 months‟ home 
confinement.  The parties have not identified any case, and 
we have not found one, in which an appellate court upheld a 
probationary sentence that so significantly varied from the 
Guidelines range.  Such a variance is genuinely extraordinary 
and should have been accompanied by a thorough 
justification of the sentence, “including an explanation for 
any deviation from the Guidelines.”  Gall, 552 U.S. at 51.  
Unfortunately, the District Court did not provide that kind of 
justification.   
 
Indeed, the Court did not acknowledge that the 
sentence it chose deviated significantly from the Guidelines.  
While the District Court properly identified the recommended 
Guidelines range of 70 to 87 months‟ imprisonment, and 
thoroughly discussed some of the § 3553(a) factors, 
particularly the nature of the offense and of the defendant, at 
no point did it describe how those factors justified a deviation 
from the recommended range down to probation and in-home 
confinement.  In a case involving such a substantial variance, 
it is not enough to note mitigating factors and then impose 
sentence.  Rather, the chain of reasoning must be complete, 
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explaining how the mitigating factors warrant the sentence 
imposed. 
 
It may be that the mitigating factors the District Court 
identified, such as Negroni‟s alleged personality disorder and 
his accompanying susceptibility to Waltzer‟s influence, could 
justify a variance.  We confess our doubts, however, and 
emphasize the Sentencing Commission‟s express concern 
with the once-common practice of sentencing “to probation 
an inappropriately high percentage of offenders guilty of 
certain economic crimes, such as theft, tax evasion, antitrust 
offenses, insider trading, fraud, and embezzlement, that in the 
Commission‟s view are „serious.‟”  U.S.S.G. § 1A1.4(d) 
(2010).  Thus, if a district court seeks to vary from the 
Guidelines recommendation of incarceration for persons who 
have committed serious white-collar crimes, it must provide a 
thorough and persuasive explanation for why the 
congressionally-approved policy of putting white-collar 
criminals in jail does not apply.  Not having done so in 
Negroni‟s case, the District Court committed procedural 
error. 
 
Part of the failure to adequately address the variance 
lies in the lack of discussion of one highly relevant § 3553(a) 
factor in these circumstances, namely the need to avoid 
unwarranted sentencing disparities among similarly situated 
individuals.  Where the Guidelines call for a minimum of 
nearly six-years‟ imprisonment, a sentence of probation 
surely implicates concerns over sentencing disparities, and 
that concern warrants explicit consideration.  While the 
District Court identified the concern and stated it had 
considered that factor, it provided no explanation for why the 
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sentence it imposed was justified despite the clear disparity it 
seemed to create.
11
 
 
In short, since there is not an adequate “explanation for 
[the] deviation from the Guidelines range,” as required by 
Gall, 552 U.S. at 51, nor an explanation “sufficient for us to 
see that the particular circumstances of the case have been 
given meaningful consideration within the parameters of 
§ 3553(a),” Levinson, 543 F.3d at 196, the sentence cannot 
stand. 
 
(2) The District Court’s Consideration of the 
Relative Culpability of Hall and Negroni 
 
The inadequacy of the explanation for Negroni‟s 
sentence is exacerbated by what appears to be an 
inconsistency in the District Court‟s assessment of the 
relative culpability of Negroni and Hall.  The Court based its 
sentence in part on the government‟s assertion that Negroni 
was less culpable than Hall.  But that assertion had been 
effectively rejected by the Court‟s own factual findings and, 
therefore, could not warrant the probationary sentence.   
                                              
11
 We say “seemed to create” because the disparities 
that matter are those between “similarly situated” individuals.  
See United States v. King, 604 F.3d 125, 145 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(“[S]entencing disparities are unreasonable only when the 
defendants are similarly situated.”).  The District Court in this 
case noted circumstances which it evidently viewed as 
distinguishing Mr. Negroni from the ordinary fraud convict.  
Whether those distinctions take Mr. Negroni out of the 
heartland of circumstances contemplated by the Guidelines is 
one of the matters requiring added explanation. 
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In seeking a sentence for Hall at the upper end of the 
Guidelines range, the government had asserted that Hall was 
more culpable than Negroni.  That assertion was based on 
“the testimony of Agent Kauffman … and the financial 
records that showed that [Hall] received over $800,000” from 
the scheme, a substantial portion of which came from frauds 
involving 250 or more victims, at least according to the 
government.  (App. at 749-50.)  In striking Paragraph 45, 
however, the District Court necessarily rejected at least some 
of the factual contentions advanced by Kauffman, and it 
implicitly rejected the government‟s basis for concluding that 
Hall was more culpable than Negroni.  That is borne out by 
the offense levels calculated for the two Appellees:  
Negroni‟s offense level was 27; Hall‟s offense level, had it 
included the six-level enhancement, would have been 29, but, 
without that enhancement, it was only 23.  Thus, having 
rejected the factual predicate for the six-level enhancement, 
the District Court also rejected the basis for concluding that 
Hall was more culpable than Negroni.   
 
Despite that rejection, when the government objected 
to Negroni‟s sentence as unreasonable, the District Court‟s 
reply was that “you [, the government,] told me it would be 
somewhere under Hall,” which suggests that the District 
Court felt constrained to give Negroni a lighter sentence than 
Hall‟s.  (App. at 645.)  Because a Court abuses its discretion 
when it bases a decision on a clearly erroneous finding of 
fact, Tomko, 562 F.3d at 567-68, the Court abused its 
discretion to the extent it concluded that Negroni needed a 
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lighter sentence than Hall despite the Court‟s rejection of the 
factual basis for concluding that Negroni was less culpable.
12
 
 
In summary, the District Court committed procedural 
error in not adequately explaining Negroni‟s sentence and in 
basing that sentence, in part, on the undermined assertion that 
Hall was more culpable than Negroni.  Consequently, 
Negroni must be resentenced. 
 
III. Conclusion 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the sentences 
of both Hall and Negroni and remand for resentencing. 
                                              
12
 We do not imply that in sentencing co-defendants a 
court cannot consider the relative culpability of  those 
defendants.  To the contrary, just as a court should ensure that 
it does not create sentencing disparities among similarly 
situated individuals, it should also ensure that its sentences 
appropriately reflect the relative culpability of individuals 
who are not similarly situated.  Here, the District Court‟s 
error is that it failed to do the former and, in doing the latter, 
erroneously gave Negroni a more lenient sentence after 
having rejected the only expressed factual basis from which 
to conclude that Negroni was less culpable.   
